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Abstract
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific
abilities. Besides investigating the appendant consequences of applying incongruent per-
formance measures in incentive contracts, this paper demonstrates how the provision of
incentives—including the optimal aggregation of information—takes the agent’s task-spe-
cific abilities into consideration. It further emphasizes the relation between job character-
istics and the principal’s preference for selecting specific agents. This paper essentially
demonstrates that differences in task-specific abilities across agents can provide a supple-
mentary explanation of why they are allocated to various jobs; or why they receive different
incentive contracts, even if their jobs are identical.
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1 Introduction
Empirical investigations have offered an abundance of evidence suggesting that individuals are
highly responsive to monetary incentives (see e.g. Asch [1990], Paarsch and Shearer [1999] and
Lazear [2000a]). Nevertheless, the specific effects of reward schemes are somewhat ambiguous
when individuals are required to perform a collection of different tasks. In such situations, Kerr
[1975] cautioned against the consequences of a reward system that inefficiently overemphasizes
some tasks while underemphasizing others. An illustrative example cited by Kerr [1975] is the
difficult trade-off between research and teaching responsibilities encountered by faculties at uni-
versities. Since teaching quality is harder to assess relative to research output, and prospective
promotion decisions mainly hinge on research performance, it is a common phenomenon for
faculty members to focus on research at the expense of teaching.1 Inefficient effort allocations
generally occur when the principal is unable to inexpensively access a performance evaluation
which perfectly coincides with her objective. If monitoring is too costly, the principal is, to
some extent, compelled to accept that an agent is motivated to allocate her effort inefficiently
across multiple tasks.
This phenomenon has prompted Holmström and Milgrom [1991] to delve into multi-task
agency relationships by investigating incentive contracts which aim at ensuring appropriate
effort allocations in addition to countervailing incentive risk and the agent’s desire for insur-
ance. Feltham and Xie [1994] also investigate inefficient effort allocations motivated by the
application of incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts. According to Feltham
and Xie [1994], incongruity arises whenever performance measures do not perfectly reflect the
agent’s contribution to firm value. They alluded that the agent is only motivated to improve her
performance evaluation, thereby leading her to focus on less or even non-valuable tasks, and
disregarding more beneficial ones [Feltham and Xie, 1994].2
Previous multi-task literature such as Feltham and Xie [1994], Banker and Thevaranjan
[2000], and Datar, Kulp, and Lambert [2001] focus on performance measure congruity and its
effects on the efficiency of incentive contracts, but absent from these studies is the possibility
that agents may perform some tasks more efficiently than others.3 Recent literature, however,
1See Brickley and Zimmerman [2001] for an empirical study of this example.
2See as well the discussion in Gibbons [1998].
3Schnedler [2003] is an exception. However, his focus is different in the sense that he investigates the conse-
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emphasizes the role of acquiring human capital for specific tasks (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower
[2000], Gibbons and Waldman [2003] and Gibbons and Waldman [2004]).4 Since individuals
differ substantially in their learning aptitudes, which inevitably lead to discrepancies in skills
and abilities [Gibbons and Waldman, 2003], it is reasonable to infer that different individuals
might perform different tasks with varying degrees of ease.5 For example, Sapienza and Gupta
[1994] indicate in their study of principal-agent relations within venture capital-backed firms
that the frequency of venture capitalist (principal) - CEO (agent) interaction is partially depen-
dent on the CEOs’ venture experience. They provide evidence that CEOs with prior experiences
(i.e. greater proficiency) in start-up ventures would have a lesser tendency of consulting with
their venture capitalist.
In order to understand the nature of contracts in multi-task agency relations, it is essential
to investigate whether and how task-specific abilities influence the agent’s preferences for her
effort allocation and the optimal provision of incentives in response to these abilities. This paper
thus focuses on multi-task agencies in order to gain new insights into the provision of incentives
if performance measures are incongruent with the principal’s objective and the agent exhibits
different abilities for performing relevant tasks.
This paper investigates how incentive contracts respond to individual task-specific abilities
combined with incongruent performance measures. It further demonstrates how the value of
performances measures can be compared in multi-task agencies. The analysis indicates that the
signal/noise ratio—sufficient to rank performance measures in single-task agencies—can only
be applied if all available measures provide the same information about the agent’s relative ef-
fort allocation. The proposed ranking criteria is in general contingent on the agent’s specific
abilities such that different agents may imply various orderings of performance measures. This
paper further considers the optimal aggregation of multiple performance measures based on the
agent’s respective task-specific abilities. If the principal has access to a sufficient quantity of
appropriate measures, it demonstrates that she can combine them in order to motivate the agent
quences of different marginal costs on the relative value of incongruent performance measures for the provision of
incentives.
4For empirical evidence see Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström [1994].
5Maher, Ramanathan, and Peterson [1979] conceive the term ‘congruence of perception with preferences’ to
indicate the phenomenon that even if an individual possesses the correct perception of different tasks, there might
still be a preference on specific tasks.
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to implement the first-best effort allocation. This, however, is only efficient, if the motivation of
the first-best effort allocation by the appropriate aggregation of performance measures contem-
poraneously maximizes the precision of the information system, which in turn is determined
by the agent’s task-specific abilities. Finally, this paper illustrates the relevance of adverse se-
lection and highlights the relation between job characteristics and the principal’s preference for
selecting specific agents.
This paper combines two strands of literature. First, the analyzed framework builds on the
multi-task agency model developed by Holmström and Milgrom [1991], and incorporates in-
congruent performance measures as analyzed by Feltham and Xie [1994], Baker [2002] and
Banker and Thevaranjan [2000]. Second, it incorporates task-specific human capital in the
sense of Gibbons and Waldman [1999], Lindbeck and Snower [2000], and Gibbons and Wald-
man [2003, 2004]. The main contribution of this paper to previous multi-task literature is the
incorporation of task-specific abilities and the investigation of their effects on incentive con-
tracts, when the principal receives only incongruent performance measures. It broadens our
understanding of incentive contracts in multi-task agency relations by providing three impor-
tant implications: First, incentive contracts are tailored to the specific abilities of agents, thereby
implying that the principal does not generally provide identical incentive contracts when agents
differ with respect to their task-specific abilities. Second, the principal’s preference for agents
with specific abilities depends on the characteristics of relevant tasks and the available informa-
tion system. Third, the principal can be indifferent between various agents, but may neverthe-
less provide them with different incentive contracts. In general, different task-specific abilities
across agents provide a supplementary explanation of why they are allocated to various jobs; or
why they receive different incentive contracts, even though their jobs are identical.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I give an overview of the model and derive the
first-best contract in section 3. I provide in section 4 the second-best contract and focus on the
relation between performance measure congruity and effort distortion in section 5. In section
6, I investigate how performance measures can be ranked in multi-task agencies, in particular
when agents are characterized by task-specific abilities. The optimal aggregation of multiple
performance measures as a device to mitigate effort distortion is analyzed in section 7. I further
investigate the role of adverse selection in section 8, and expose the principal’s preference for
specific agents. Section 9 concludes.
3
2 The Model
Consider a single-period agency relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse
agent. The principal owns an asset and requires the agent’s productive effort. Once employed,
the agent is in charge of performing n ≥ 2 tasks (multi-tasking). These tasks are tied together,
i.e. the principal cannot split and allocate them to different agents.6 The agent implements an
effort vector e = (e1, ..., en)t, e ∈ E ⊆ Rn+, where ei is the agent’s effort allocated to task i.7
Effort is non-verifiable and all activities ei ∈ E are measured in the same unit.
To incorporate task-specific abilities for the agent, I adapt Lazear’s [2000b] approach for a
single-task agency model to this multi-task framework. In this sense, the abilities differ across
tasks and determine the absolute and marginal effort costs borne by the agent. LetΨ be an n×n
matrix representing the agent’s task-specific abilities. The agent’s effort costs are contingent on
Ψ and take the form C(e) = etΨe/2. For the ease of illustrating the basic relationship between
performance measure congruity and effort distortion by using geometric interpretations, I first
restrict the analysis to the case where the abilities across different tasks are mutually exclusive
of one another. Accordingly, Ψ is a diagonal n × n matrix defined by Ψ = diag (ψ1, ..., ψn),
ψi > 0, i = 1, .., n. I will relax this assumption in section 7 and allow the agent to feature cost
substitutes or complements. A higher ability for performing task i is characterized by a lower
ψi, i = 1, ..., n, and vice versa.8 I first treat these task-specific abilities as exogenous in order to
illustrate the corresponding incentives contracts and induced effort distortions for a given type
of agent. However, I will emphasize the principal’s preference for employing particular agents
by elaborating on adverse selection in section 8.
The agent’s preferences are represented by the negative exponential utility function
U(w, e) = − exp [−ρ (w − C(e))] , (1)
where ρ denotes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion and w as the agent’s wage.
For parsimony, let w¯ = 0 be her reservation wage implying a reservation utility U¯ = −1.
6For considerations on how multiple tasks are efficiently split among several agents, refer e.g. to Holmström
and Milgrom [1991], Corts [2005], and Schöttner [2005].
7All used vectors are column vectors where ‘t’ denotes the transpose.
8A similar approach is used by MacLeod [1996], where ψi, i = 1, ..., n, are random variables. However, his
work is different in the sense that he focuses on the relationship between explicit and implicit incentive contracts
rather than on the effort distortion induced by incongruent performance measurement.
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By conducting effort e, the agent contributes to the principal’s non-verifiable gross payoff
V (e) = µte + εV , where εV is a normally distributed random component with zero mean
and variance σ2V , representing firm-specific and economy wide risk. The n-dimensional vector
µ = (µ1, ..., µn)
t, µi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n, characterizes the marginal effect of e on gross payoff
V (e). Since V (e) is non-verifiable, it cannot be part of an explicit single-period incentive
contract. The only verifiable information about e, however, is provided by the performance
measure
P (e) = ωte+ ε, (2)
where ω = (ω1, ..., ωn)t ∈ Rn+ is the vector of performance measure sensitivities. The random
component ε is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2, and represents potential
effects on the performance measure beyond the agent’s control.
As pointed out by Feltham and Xie [1994], the performance measure does not necessarily
capture the agent’s contribution to the gross payoff perfectly. Formally, if there exists a constant
λ 6= 0 satisfyingµ = λω, performance measure P (e) is congruent with the gross payoff V (e).9
Otherwise, the performance measure is incongruent and its application in an incentive contract
motivates the agent to implement an inefficient effort allocation across tasks [Feltham and Xie,
1994, Baker, 2002].
Baker [2002] provided a geometric measure for performance measure congruity. Since his
result is fundamental to the subsequent analysis, it is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1. The congruence of performance measure P (e) to gross payoff V (e) with respect
to the marginal effect of e is measured by ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ, where ϕ is the angle between the
vector of gross payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω.
Accordingly, as long as vector µ and vector ω are linearly independent, the performance
measure does not reflect the agent’s contribution to gross payoff, and therefore, is incongruent.
Formally, there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λω, thereby implying ϕ 6= 0. A
more congruent performance measure thereby implies a smaller angle ϕ and leads to a higher
9This phenomenon is described by several terms in the multi-task agency literature: performance measure
congruity [Feltham and Xie, 1994, Bushman, Indjejikian, and Penno, 2000, Hughes, Zhang, and Xie, 2005], non-
distorted performance measure [Baker, 2000, 2002], and goal congruence [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995,
Banker and Thevaranjan, 2000]. For the sake of consistence, I use the term performance measure congruity
throughout this paper.
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measure of congruity ΥC(ϕ) due to the definition of the cosine. Finally note that ϕ ∈ [0, pi/2]
since µi, ωi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n, where ϕ is represented in radian measure.
In line with previous multi-task literature, I restrict my analysis to a compensation scheme
w which is linear in performance measure P (e). The payment w takes therefore the form
w(e) = α+ βP (e), (3)
where α denotes the fixed payment and β denotes the incentive parameter. The transfer α is
utilized to split the surplus between the principal and the agent, whereas β is used to provide
the agent with incentives for implementing effort.
Since the compensation scheme is linear, the agent’s utility is exponential, and the error term
is normally distributed, maximizing the agent’s expected utility is analogous to maximizing her
certainty equivalent
CE(e) = α+ βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2, (4)
where ρβ2σ2/2 is the required risk premium in order to compensate the agent for the uncertainty
in her incentive payment βP (e).
The timing of this problem is as follows. First, the principal offers the agent a contract
(α∗, β∗). If this contract guarantees the agent at least the same expected utility as her best
alternative, she accepts. After the agent implemented e and the random variables ε and εV are
realized, the payments take place.
For clarification, I subsequently illustrate the distinction between effort intensity and effort
allocation. Formally, let two arbitrary activities ek and ej vary to eˆk and eˆj , respectively. If
the ratio between both activities remains identical such that ek/ej = eˆk/eˆj , k, j = 1, ..., n,
k 6= j, the relative effort allocation remains the same. In contrast, if ek/ej 6= eˆk/eˆj for at
least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, the relative effort allocation varies. The overall effort
intensity, however, changes without affecting the effort allocation, if there exists a constant
λ > 0 satisfying e = λeˆ, where eˆ is the modified effort vector.
For the ease of comparing different effort allocations, it is useful to commit to the subsequent
definition throughout this paper.
Definition 2. The agent implements a distorted effort allocation if there exists no constant λ 6= 0
satisfying µ = λe.
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The implemented effort allocation is referred to be distorted if it does not reflect the agent’s
marginal contribution to gross payoff V (e). Note, however, that non-distortion is not necessar-
ily optimal since this concept does not incorporate the corresponding costs for implementing an
arbitrary effort vector.
3 The First-Best Contract
Before I move on to the second-best contract, it is useful to derive the first-best solution of
this problem as a benchmark for the subsequent analyzes. Then, the first-best effort allocation
and intensity can be compared to the second-best environment, where the agent’s effort is non-
contractible so that moral hazard occurs.
Suppose the principal can specify a desired effort intensity and allocation in an enforceable
contract. In this case, she appoints the effort vector e which maximizes the difference between
the expected gross payoff V (e) and costs w = C(e):
max
e
Π(e) = µte− 1
2
etΨe. (5)
Let φ ≡ Ψ−1µ = (µ1/ψ1, ..., µn/ψn)t be the vector of the payoff-cost sensitivity ratios. Then,
the first-best effort vector is
efb = φ. (6)
The principal maximizes her expected profit by assigning each activity ei in accordance to its
payoff-cost sensitivity ratio µi/ψi, i = 1, ..., n. Activities with high ratios are consequently
more intensively conducted relative to activities with low ratios.
Recall that efb is distorted if there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λefb, see defini-
tion 2. In contrast, if the agent has different abilities across tasks, it is optimal to implement a
distorted effort allocation in order to balance the benefits and costs of all relevant tasks.
By substituting efb in (5) and using the relation µtφ = ‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ for vector products,
the expected first-best profit becomes
Πfb =
1
2
‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ, (7)
where κ is the angle between vectorµ and vectorφ, and ‖·‖ denotes the length of the respective
vector.
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The agent’s task-specific abilities affect the expected first-best profit in two ways. The first
effect is a result of the overall cost intensity for implementing an arbitrary effort vector. To
illustrate this effect, consider two agents A and B characterized by ΨA and ΨB, respectively.
If ΨA = λΨB, λ > 1, agent A exhibits a less overall cost intensity than agent B for the
implementation of an arbitrary effort vector. Observe, however, that both agents share the same
relative task-specific abilities across tasks. Therefore, λ‖φA‖ = ‖φB‖, whereas κA = κB.
The second effect follows from the relation between the payoff sensitivities µ and the agent’s
relative task-specific abilities Ψ. Consider for instance the agent’s ability ψi to perform task
i. If this ability is increasing (i.e. ψi decreases) relative to the other abilities, the agent could
implement the same effort vector, but suffers less disutility of effort for performing task i. In
this case, ‖φ‖ increases. However, the effect on κ is ambiguous. Particularly, decreasing ψi
leads to a higher angle κ if ψi < 1, and to a lower κ, otherwise. For the principal, however, it
is optimal to enhance efbi until the marginal benefit of task i is equal to its marginal costs, i.e.
µi = ψiei. Consequently, Πfb increases. This eventually implies that a potential decline in cosκ
is preponderated by an increase of ‖φ‖.
4 The Second-Best Contract
If the principal cannot directly contract over e, she faces an incentive problem for motivating the
agent to implement appropriate effort. Since the gross payoff V (e) is non-verifiable, the only
contractible information is the performance measure P (e). However, the application of P (e)
in an incentive contract may cause two inefficiencies. First, the performance measure—and
therefore the agent’s compensation—is uncertain such that the risk-averse agent requires a risk
premium for accepting a contract dependent on P (e). Second, the performance measure can be
incongruent and, therefore, motivate the agent to inefficiently allocate her effort across tasks.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the second inefficiency since the trade-off between incentive
risk and the agent’s desire for insurance is intensively analyzed by previous literature.10
In a second-best environment, the principal’s problem is to design a contract (α∗, β∗) that
maximizes her expected profit Π = E[V (e) − w(e)] while ensuring the agent’s participation.
10For a detailed analysis in a LEN-setting, see e.g. Spremann [1987], Baker [1992], and Prendergast [1999];
and for a general approach Shavell [1979], Holmström [1979], Grossman and Hart [1983], and Rees [1985].
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The optimal linear contract therefore solves
max
α,β,e
Π ≡ µte− α− βωte (8)
s.t.
e = argmax
e˜
α+ βωte˜− 1
2
e˜tΨe˜− ρ
2
β2σ2 (9)
α+ βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2 ≥ 0, (10)
where (9) is the agent’s incentive condition and (10) her participation constraint.
First, observe that (9) can be replaced by e = Ψ−1ωβ. For the subsequent analysis, let
Γ ≡ Ψ−1ω = (ω1/ψ1, ..., ωn/ψn)t be the vector of measure-cost sensitivity ratios. Thus, the
agent implements
e∗ = Γβ. (11)
In contrast to the first-best scenario, the agent’s effort ei for performing task i depends on the
measure-cost sensitivity ratio ωi/ψi and the incentive parameter β.
In order to maximize her expected profit, the principal sets α such that the agent’s partic-
ipation constraint is binding. By solving (10) for α and substituting the resulting expression
together with e∗ in the principal’s objective function (8), the maximization problem simplifies
to
max
β
Π ≡ µtΓβ − β
2
2
[
ωtΓ+ ρσ2
]
. (12)
The first-derivative of Π with respect to β gives the optimal incentive parameter
β∗ =
µtΓ
ωtΓ+ ρσ2
. (13)
Besides the precision of the performance measure, 1/σ2, with the agent’s risk tolerance, 1/ρ,
the optimal incentive parameter is a function of the gross payoff sensitivitiesµ, the performance
measure sensitivities ω, and the measure-cost sensitivity ratios Γ. Recall that Γ = Ψ−1ω, i.e.
Γ comprises the agent’s task-specific abilities Ψ. Hence, β∗ incorporates Ψ in two ways: (i)
by its relation to the gross payoff sensitivities µ in the numerator; and (ii), by its relation to
the performance measure sensitivities ω in the numerator and denominator. It can therefore be
inferred that agents with different task-specific abilities may obtain diverse incentive contracts,
even if they are in charge of performing an identical set of tasks and evaluated by the same
information system.
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Substituting β∗ in (12) and using geometric representations give the principal’s expected
second-best profit
Π∗ =
‖µ‖2‖Γ‖2 cos2 θ
2(‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ + ρσ2) , (14)
where θ denotes the angle between the vector of payoff sensitivitiesµ and the vector of measure-
cost sensitivity ratios Γ. The angle between the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω
and vector Γ is denoted by ξ.
5 Performance Measure Congruity and Effort Distortion
In this section, I focus more intensively on performance measure congruity and its effect on
effort distortion if the agent performs different tasks with varying degrees of ease.
Performance measure congruity refers to the degree of alignment between the agent’s marginal
effect on her performance measure and on the expected gross payoff [Feltham and Xie, 1994].
Performance measure congruity can thus be characterized by the angle ϕ between the vector
of payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω, as emphasized
by Baker [2002]. In contrast, effort distortion refers to the relation between an implemented
effort vector e and the vector of the payoff sensitivities µ. If the agent’s effort allocation re-
flects its relative contribution to V (e), her effort is non-distorted, see definition 2. However, as
shown in section 3, effort distortion is not necessarily inefficient. Even the first-best effort is
distorted if the agent has comparative advantages in performing some tasks relative to others.
Nevertheless, a distorted effort allocation is inefficient if it deviates from the one implemented
under first-best. The agent implements an efficient (first-best) effort allocation if there exists a
constant λ > 0 satisfying efb = λe∗. Recall that efb = Ψ−1µ and e∗ = βΨ−1ω. This leads to
the first observation.
Corollary 1. Only a congruent performance measure with µ = λω, λ ∈ R∗, leads to a first-
best effort allocation. If in addition ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, the second-best effort vector e∗ is
non-distorted.
Observe that the first part of this corollary is independent of the agent’s task-specific abili-
ties. Consequently, I achieve the same observation as Feltham and Xie [1994] even for a more
general setting with task-specific abilities. If the applied performance measure is incongruent,
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we can infer that the agent is motivated to implement an inefficient effort allocation, regardless
of her characteristics. However, the extent of this inefficiency is determined byΨ. Finally, iden-
tical task-specific abilities additionally lead to non-distorted effort if the applied performance
measure is congruent. The rationale for this observation is that identical abilities for performing
all relevant tasks imply that the agent’s preference for her effort allocation is only determined
by the relative contribution of her tasks to the performance measure. If this measure reflects the
agent’s relative contribution to firm value, i.e. it is congruent, she is motivated to implement
non-distorted effort.
As we know from previous literature, the principal can motivate the agent to implement any
desired effort intensity by providing an appropriate incentive parameter β. In contrast, the effort
allocation cannot be controlled by the principal, as long as the underlying information system
generates only one performance measure. It can be deduced from previous observations that Γ
plays an important role for the induced effort allocation.
Proposition 1. If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then ΥD(θ) = cos θ
measures effort distortion under second-best.
Proof See appendix.
Note that the measure ΥD(θ) is negatively related to effort distortion. The less distorted the
agent’s effort allocation with respect to µ is, the smaller is θ, and consequently, the higher is
ΥD(θ). If θ = 0, the application of performance measure P (e) motivates non-distorted effort.
Observe, however, that an incongruent performance measure induces non-distorted effort if
µ = λβΓ, λ ∈ R∗, or equivalently,
ω = Ψµ (λβ)−1 . (15)
In this case, the performance measure sensitivitiesω are a transformation of the agent’s marginal
contribution to gross payoff µ and her task-specific abilities Ψ. However, as pointed out by
corollary 1, a non-distorted effort allocation can only be optimal if P (e) is perfectly congruent
and the agent experiences identical abilities for performing all relevant tasks.
Suppose the available performance measure P (e) changes such that the agent is motivated
to implement a less distorted effort allocation. Formally, θ decreases. This implies, ceteris
paribus, a higher expected profitΠ∗. Note, however, that there is a second effect onΠ∗ captured
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Figure 1: Performance Measure Congruity and Effort Distortion for n = 3
by ξ as the angle between ω and Γ. To illustrate this effect, we can re-formulate the agent’s
effort costs by substituting e∗:
C(·) = 1
2
β2‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ. (16)
The properties of the agent’s task-specific abilities affect her effort costs in two ways. The first
effect is a result of the effort cost intensity over all tasks. For illustrative purposes, assume that
the effort costs take the form C(e) = etλΨe/2 with λ > 0. Increasing λ implies that all tasks
become more costly to perform, thereby leading to a higher ‖Γ‖ without affecting cos ξ. The
second effect is caused by the relation between the performance measure sensitivities ω and the
agent’s task-specific abilitiesΨ. The relative abilities across tasks thereby affect ‖Γ‖ and cos ξ.
Recall that ‖Γ‖ determines the effort intensity without affecting the allocation. In contrast, cos ξ
measures the agent’s effort costs (in utility terms) for a particular effort allocation motivated by
P (e).
Corollary 2. If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then ΥM/C(ξ) = cos ξ
characterizes the measure-cost efficiency.
The previous results are illustrated in figure 1 for the three-dimensional case (n = 3). Be-
sides the second-best effort vector e∗, it depicts the vectors of the gross payoff sensitivities µ,
performance measure sensitivities ω, and measure-cost sensitivity ratios Γ. The effort vector
e∗ has the same direction as Γ, only their lengths differ, depending on β. Observe that e∗ is
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not necessarily on the plane spanned by µ and ω. The location of e∗ relative to µ character-
izes the induced effort distortion (angle θ), whereas the relation between µ and ω measures
the congruity of performance measure P (e) (angle ϕ). Finally, the measure-cost efficiency is
characterized by the relation of Γ to ω (angle ξ).
If vector µ and vector ω point in the same direction, then efb = λe∗, λ > 0, i.e. the
incentive contract motivates the agent to implement the first-best effort allocation, see corollary
1. Nevertheless, inducing a first-best effort intensity by adjusting β can only be optimal if the
agent is either risk-neutral or the performance measure is perfectly precise. Otherwise, the
principal imposes to much incentive risk on the agent which requires the payment of a higher
risk premium to ensure her participation.
Now consider the case where the agent has identical abilities for all tasks, i.e. ψi = ψˆ > 0,
i = 1, ..., n. As a consequence, Γ = ω/ψˆ so that vector Γ and vector ω point in the same
direction. This additionally implies that e∗ = ωβ/ψˆ and ξ = 0. Thus, e∗ and ω are identical
with respect to their direction, only their lengths differ, depending on β and ψˆ. Accordingly,
the measure of congruity is now identical to the measure of distortion. This observation is
summarized and proofed by the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 2. If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then ΥD(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ.
Proof See appendix.
If agents do not exhibit different task-specific abilities, performance measure congruity and
effort distortion are captured by the same measure. However, if we allow the agent to possess
different abilities across tasks, it becomes pivotal to distinguish between both concepts. The ap-
plication of incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts leads to inefficient effort
allocations, but the extent of these inefficiencies are further determined by the agent’s relative
abilities for performing the relevant tasks.
Consider again the expected second-best profit Π∗ from section 4. According to the pre-
vious observations, it depends on three elements: (i) the measure of distortion ΥD(θ) in the
numerator; (ii) the measure-cost efficiency ΥM/C(ξ) in the denominator; and (iii), the agent’s
risk aversion ρ in conjunction with the variance σ2 of the applied performance measure in the
denominator. It is common knowledge that the trade-off between incentive risk and the agent’s
desire for insurance affects optimal incentive contracts. Moreover, as demonstrated by Feltham
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and Xie [1994] and Baker [2002], incentive contracts in multi-task agency relations are adjusted
to the congruity of applied performance measures. However, the previous analysis indicates that
the measure-costs efficiency is a third crucial factor whenever the agent performs some tasks
more efficiently than others due to task-specific abilities.
6 Ranking Performance Measures
As Feltham and Xie [1994] emphasized, performance measures may differ with respect to their
congruity and precision. The previous analysis additionally indicates that task-specific abilities
play a crucial role for the contract efficiency. This section therefore focuses on how the attributes
of performance measures and agents eventually determine the relative value of measures in
multi-task agencies.
Consider a set P ofm ≥ 2 performance measures Pi(e) = ωtie+ εi, with Pi(e) ∈ P ⊆ Rm
and εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ).11 To illustrate the relative value of individual performance measures, we
can compare the expected profits each of them would induce if applied in the agent’s incentive
contract. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is referred to be strictly superior, if it provides the
principal a strictly higher expected profit than all other available measures Pi(e) ∈ P, i 6= k.
Thus, I first ignore the value of combining several measures and defer the consideration of this
possibility to the next section.
For single-task agency relations, Kim and Suh [1991] have shown that the value of per-
formance measures can be compared by their respective signal/noise ratio. By adjusting their
definition to a multi-task agency setting, the signal/noise ratio of performance measures Pi(e)
is
Λi =
(∇Pi(e∗))t (∇Pi(e∗))
σ2i
, (17)
where ∇Pi(e∗) is the gradient of performance measure Pi(e) with respect to e. In single-task
agencies, performance measures with higher signal/noise ratios provide more precise informa-
tion about the implemented effort and are therefore preferred to measures with lower ratios. In
this multi-task setting, the signal/noise ratio of performance measures Pi(e) is
Λi =
‖ωi‖2
σ2i
. (18)
11Subscript i refers henceforth to performance measure Pi(e) ∈ P.
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One can infer from the previous analysis that signal/noise ratios are not necessarily sufficient
to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies, especially, when agents differ in their
task-specific abilities. This deduction is supported by the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any other performance mea-
sure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if,
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
ΥM/C(ξk)
(ΥD(θk))2
+
ρσ2k
‖Γk‖2(ΥD(θk))2 <
‖ωj‖
‖Γj‖
ΥM/C(ξj)
(ΥD(θj))2
+
ρσ2j
‖Γj‖2(ΥD(θj))2 , (19)
where ΥD(θi) is the measure of distortion induced by Pi(e), and ΥM/C(ξi) is the related quan-
tification for the measure-cost efficiency, i = {j, k}.
Proof Follows directly by rearranging Π∗(Pk(e)) > Π∗(Pj(e)) and substituting ΥM/C(ξi) =
cos ξi and ΥD(θi) = cos θi, i = k, j.
The value of a performance measure in comparison to any other measure is contingent
on two ratios: (i) the normalized ratio between the measure-cost efficiency ΥM/C(·) and the
induced effort distortionΥD(·); and, (ii) the normalized inverse of the distortion measureΥD(·)
with the precision 1/σ2k of the performance measure and the agent’s risk tolerance 1/ρ. Observe
finally that performance measure congruity does not directly enter into this ranking criteria.
It, however, affects indirectly the measure of effort distortion ΥD(θi) and the measure-cost
efficiency characterized by ΥM/C(ξi).
In fact, the value of performance measures in multi-task agencies cannot necessarily be
compared by their respective signal/noise ratios. It is rather pivotal to take the induced effort
distortion and measure-cost efficiency into consideration—both determined by the performance
measure sensitivities ωi relative to the agent’s task specific abilities Ψ. Therefore, comparing
the value of performance measures requires specific knowledge about the agent’s character-
istics, which is not necessary for ranking performance measures in single-task agencies. In
multi-task agencies, however, the agent’s characteristics eventually determine the principal’s
preference for a specific information system.
Corollary 3. Suppose ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly
superior to any other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if,
1
ΥC(ϕk)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1k
] 1
2
<
1
ΥC(ϕj)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1j
] 1
2
, (20)
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where Λi, i = {j, k}, is the signal/noise ratio of performance measure Pi(e), and ΥC(ϕi) its
congruity measure.
Proof See appendix.
If the agent’s preference for an effort allocation depends only on the characteristics of her
performance evaluation since her abilities are identical for all tasks, we can use adjusted sig-
nal/noise ratios to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies. Nevertheless, it is still
required to know ψˆ and ρ in order to assess the relative value of performance measures.
The subsequent proposition offers a sufficient condition ensuring that performance measures
can be ranked exclusively by their respective signal/noise ratios, and therefore, independent of
the agent’s characteristics.
Proposition 4. Suppose there exist constants λj 6= 0 satisfyingωi = λjωj for all i, j = 1, ...,m,
i 6= j. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any other performance measure
Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if, Λk > Λj .
Proof See appendix.
Accordingly, the signal/noise ratio is sufficient to rank performance measures in multi-task
agencies, if all measures provide the same information about the agent’s relative effort alloca-
tion. In this case, observe that ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), i, j = 1, ...,m, i.e. all performance mea-
sures share the same measure of congruity.12 As a consequence, every available performance
measure—if applied in the agent’s incentive contract—would imply the same effort distortion
and measure-cost efficiency. Then, their relative value is defined by their precision and scale,
which in turn is represented by their respective signal/noise ratio.
To investigate the effects of task-specific abilities on the ordering of performance measures,
it is insightful to eliminate effects related to their precision. By setting ρ = 0, condition (19)
simplifies to
ν
cos2 θk
cos2 θj
>
cos ξk
cos ξj
, ν =
‖ωj‖
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
‖Γj‖ . (21)
The value of performance measure Pk(e) relative to Pj(e) depends—besides on their precision
and scaling as previously emphasized—on their relative effort distortion (cos θi) and relative
12Note that the reversed inference cannot be made, i.e. if ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), it is not necessarily true that
ωi = λjωj , λj 6= 0, i, j = 1, ...,m, i 6= j. In this case, the signal/noise ratio is not sufficient to rank performance
measures in multi-task agencies.
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measure-cost efficiency (cos ξi) weighted by the multiplier ν, i = k, j. In order to make both
measures comparable, it is essential to normalize their scale ‖ωi‖, and exclude their effect on
‖Γi‖, i = k, j. Accordingly, if either the agent is risk-neutral or the realization of performance
measures is not influenced by random effects, the relative value of performance measures de-
pends on two factors: (i) the motivated effort allocation and its contribution to gross payoff
V (e); and, (ii) the imposed costs to motivate this effort allocation.
7 Multiple Performance Measures
Even though the consideration of single performance measures provides important insights into
incentive mechanisms when agents are placed in charge of several tasks, it is more reason-
able to assume that the principal has access to multiple performance measures, e.g. different
accounting numbers. If these additional measures are informative, they should be used to im-
prove incentive contracts [Holmström, 1979]. This section focuses on the optimal aggregation
of multiple performance measures, when the agent exhibits different task-specific abilities.
For the subsequent analysis, suppose an information system generates an m-dimensional
vector of performance measures P = (P1(e), ..., Pm(e))t, P ∈ Rm. Let Ξ = (ωt1, ...,ωtm)t be
them× n matrix of the respective performance measure sensitivities, where the n-dimensional
vector ωi summarizes the performance measure sensitivities of Pi(e). Accordingly, P can be
written as
P = Ξe+ ε, (22)
where ε = (ε1, ..., εm)t is a normally distributedm-dimensional vector of random variables with
zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. Due to the more general characteristic of the subsequent
analysis, we can now relax our initial assumption with respect toΨ and may assume that some
elements in Ψ beyond the diagonal are strictly positive or strictly negative, i.e. some activities
are complements or substitutes. In order to ensure that its inverse exists, Ψ is assumed to be a
positive definite matrix.
If the principal applies multiple performance measures in the agent’s incentive contract, her
certainty equivalent modifies to
CE(e) = α+ βtΞe− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
βtΣβ, (23)
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where β = (β1, ..., βm)t is an m-dimensional vector of incentive parameters and represents
the weight for each performance measure in the linear aggregation. Since the noise terms are
normally distributed, the linear aggregation of performance measures is optimal [Banker and
Datar, 1989].
The solution concept for deducing the optimal linear contract dependent on P is similar to
the one applied in section 4. First, the agent maximizes her certainty equivalent by choosing
e∗ = Ψ−1Ξtβ. (24)
The agent’s preference for an effort allocation depends on her task-specific abilities Ψ and the
marginal effect of each task on her aggregated performance evaluation Ξtβ. In contrast to the
single performance measure case, the principal can now influence the agent’s effort allocation
by adjusting the weight βi, thereby altering the agent’s marginal effect on her performance
evaluation.
The principal’s problem is to define a contract (α∗,β∗), dependent on P , which maximizes
her expected profit Π = E[V (e) − w(e)]. In order to minimize costs, it is optimal to set
α such that the agent’s participation constraint is binding. Solving CE(e) = 0 for α and
substituting this expression together with e∗ = Ψ−1Ξtβ in the principal’s objective function
yield an unconstrained maximization problem:
max
β
Π ≡ µtΨ−1Ξtβ − 1
2
βtΞΨ−1Ξtβ − ρ
2
βtΣβ. (25)
The first-order condition with respect to β leads to
β∗ =
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1µ, (26)
where
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1 is the inverse of an m × m matrix. We can infer from β∗ that
the objective of aggregating performance measures is to balance three effects: (i) the effort
distortion characterized by ΞΨ−1µ, (ii) the measure-cost efficiency described by ΞΨ−1Ξt;
and (iii), the precision of the aggregated performance evaluation with the agent’s risk tolerance,
characterized by ρΣ.13 The more risk averse the agent is, the more important becomes the latter
13For a detailed analysis and discussion how performance measures are balanced in an aggregate, refer to Datar
et al. [2001]. However, since they do not consider different task-specific abilities, their observations are slightly
different in the sense that in their optimal aggregation the measure-cost efficiency does not play a role and therefore,
effort distortion is only affected by the performance measure congruity.
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effect for β. Since these three effects are also determined by the agent’s characteristics Ψ and
ρ, we can conclude that the optimal aggregation of information is tied to individual agents.
Roughly speaking, the principal tailors the aggregation of available performance measures to
the specific characteristics of agents.
As mentioned earlier, the principal can influence the agent’s effort allocation if she receives
more than one performance measure. Note, however, that this is only feasible if at least two
available measures do not contain the same information about the agent’s relative effort alloca-
tion. Formally, for at least two performance measures Pj(e), Pk(e) ∈ P there exists no constant
ϑ 6= 0 satisfying ωj = ϑωk, j 6= k. By combining these measures appropriately, the principal
can—besides mitigating the uncertainty in the aggregated measure—improve the agent’s effort
allocation.
Proposition 5. If there exist no constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying ωk = ϑlωl, k 6= l, k, l ∈ {1, ...,m},
for at least h performance measures with n ≤ h ≤ m, the principal can aggregate these
measures such that the agent implements e∗ = λefb, 0 < λ ≤ 1. However, this is only optimal,
if and only if,
ρΣ = λˆ ΞΨ−1Ξt, λˆ =
1− λ
λ
. (27)
Proof See appendix.
The first condition in proposition 5 emphasizes that the principal needs access to an infor-
mation system generating at least the same quantity of performance measures as number of
tasks the agent has to perform.14 Moreover, their sensitivity vectors are required to be linearly
independent, i.e. performance measures differ in their information content with respect to the
implemented effort allocation. If these two requirements are satisfied, the principal can com-
bine these measures appropriately in order to motivate the agent to implement the first-best
effort allocation. As the second condition in proposition 5 highlights, the aggregation of perfor-
mance measures with the purpose of motivating the first-best effort allocation is only optimal
if the covariance matrix Σ is a transformation of the measure-cost efficiency ΞΨ−1Ξt. In this
case, aggregating performance measures to exclusively motivate the first-best effort allocation
contemporaneously maximizes the precision of the aggregate, and consequently, minimizes the
14Note that this condition is sufficient, i.e. the principal can also induce a first-best effort allocation with less
performance measures if e.g. one measure is perfectly congruent.
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agent’s risk premium. However, the most important observation is that (27) is also tied to the
agent’s characteristics Ψ and ρ. If the principal can employ a ‘suitable’ agent for a given in-
formation system, the optimal incentive contract may eventually motivate the first-best effort
allocation.
Even though it might be optimal from the principal’s perspective to provide the agent with
incentives motivating the first-best effort allocation, it is not necessarily optimal that they con-
temporaneously induce a first-best effort intensity, as the next corollary to proposition 5 empha-
sizes.
Corollary 4. Suppose there exist no constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying ωk = ϑlωl, k 6= l, k, l ∈
{1, ...,m}, for h performance measures with n ≤ h ≤ m. Then, it is optimal to induce efb, if
and only if, either ρ = 0 or Σ = [0]ij , i, j = 1, ...,m.
Proof See appendix.
Consequently, the optimal linear incentive contract motivates the agent to implement a first-
best effort allocation and intensity if two fundamental criteria are satisfied. First, the principal
has access to at least the same quantity of appropriate performance measures as quantity of
relevant tasks. These measures are required to provide different information about the imple-
mented effort allocation. Second, either all performance measures are perfectly precise (i.e.
noiseless) or the agent is risk-neutral. For single-task agencies, it is well known that the second
criteria is sufficient to achieve first-best if the agent is not financially constrained. Multi-task
agencies, however, impose additional requirements on the information system with respect to
the characteristics and quantity of generated performance measures. In particular, the principal
needs access to an information system which can be adjusted such that it reflects the agent’s
multidimensional contribution to gross payoff. Then, the principal can motivate the agent to
conduct an efficient effort allocation by providing her congruent incentives.
8 Adverse Selection
The preceding analyzes indicates that the properties of the agent’s task-specific abilities play a
crucial role for the design of incentive contracts and the value of employing particular agents.
This offers the principal sufficient latitude to enhance her expected profit by applying adverse
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selection mechanisms aimed at choosing the ‘most appropriate’ agent for a given information
system and set of tasks. The objective of this section is a brief illustration of adverse selection in
multi-task agencies, when agents differ with respect to their task-specific abilities. The focus is
thereby on the characteristics of the most beneficial type from the principal’s perspective, rather
than on the mechanism design itself.15
Suppose there exists a non-empty set of agentsA. Each agent i ∈ A is characterized by her
individual task-specific abilities Ψi and risk tolerance 1/ρi. For simplicity, each agent knows
her own type prior to signing the contract. The respective types are exogenous and do not change
over time. The principal, however, can neither observe the agents’ types nor does she receive
any signals indicating the respective types, but she knows the distribution of available types in
the economy. Accordingly, she can adjust the incentive contract such that only a desired type
accepts, whereas less preferred types refuse. Precisely speaking, the principal sets the contract
parameters α and β such that the participation constraint for a superior type ti(Ψi, ρi), i ∈ A,
is binding, and violated for all less valuable types j ∈ A, j 6= i. Suppose the principal wants to
employ a type i and the corresponding incentive contract would also ensure the participation of
another type k, with i, k ∈ A. Then, two cases are possible. First, k’s participation constraint is
also binding, thereby implying k’s employment as equally valuable as i’s from the principal’s
perspective. Second, k’s participation constraint is not binding so that she could extract an
economic rent. If this is the case, we can infer that the employment of k is strictly superior and
the principal is better off by tailoring the incentive contract to her characteristics.
Recall that the optimal linear incentive contract derived in section 7 implies that the partici-
pation constraint for a given type is binding. Thus, from an analytical perspective, it is sufficient
to compare the expected profits induced by each available type in order to identify the ‘most
appropriate’ one. A type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) is therefore superior from the principal’s perspective if her
employment guarantees the highest of all feasible expected profits. Formally,
tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ)→ Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = max {Π(Ψi, ρi)}i∈A . (28)
Consequently, the principal tailors the incentive contract to her characteristics and provides the
agent with (α(Ψˆ, ρˆ),β(Ψˆ, ρˆ)). Using the results from section 7, the problem can be formulated
15For adverse selection models refer e.g. to Salanié [1997] and Bolton and Dewatripont [2005], and the ref-
erences therein. For adverse selection in a multi-task agency setting where agents’ talents also affect their effort
costs, see Moen and Rosen [2001].
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as
tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ)→ Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = max
{
1
2
µtΨ−1i Ξ
t
[
ΞΨ−1i Ξ
t + ρiΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1i µ
}
i∈A
. (29)
Identifying the superior type is not trivial since this condition depends on specific matrix prod-
ucts and the inverse of an m×m matrix. Nevertheless, the next proposition summarizes some
inferences about the superior type satisfying (29).
Proposition 6. Suppose there exists a non-empty set of agents A, each of them characterized
by ti(Ψi, ρi), i ∈ A. Then, the superior type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) balances the following effects in the most
efficient way:
(i): The measure-cost efficiency effect characterized by ΞΨ−1i Ξ
t,
(ii): The distortion effect characterized by µtΨ−1i Ξ
t and its transpose,
(iii): The risk effect characterized by ρiΣ.
In principle, the value of particular agents depends—besides on their task-specific abilities
and risk-aversion—on the subsequent job characteristics: (i) the number and properties of per-
formance measures generated by an information system; and (ii), the relative contribution of all
tasks to gross payoff. To exemplify the latter job characteristic, recall thatµtΨ−1i Ξ
t emphasizes
the effort distortion as a result of the information congruity relative to the agent’s task-specific
abilities Ψi. Consider for instance two organizations k and l with identical information sys-
tems. They have different preferences for agents if there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying
µk = λµl. Otherwise, k’s gross payoff function is (possibly) differently scaled than l’s without
affecting the induced effort distortion. In this case, the distortion effect is identical for both
organizations, which leads to identical preferences for specific types.16
The relation between these emphasized effects provides two main implications for the se-
lection of agents. First, organizations, or subunits, with different information systems may
prefer different types, even if their gross payoff functions are identical. This observation fol-
lows directly from the distortion effect, measure-cost efficiency effect and risk effect. Second,
organizations, or subunits, with different gross payoff functions may choose different types,
even if they have access to identical information systems. This is implied by the distortion
16Note that the same inference about two information systems characterized by Ξk = λΞl, λ 6= 0, cannot be
made. This is due to their respective scale and its effect on the precision of the information system relative to the
information content.
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effect. Generally speaking, the individual value of available agents can only be assessed with
respect to the corresponding job characteristics: (i) the relevant tasks and their contribution
to firm’s outcome; and (ii), the precision and congruity of the available information system.
For illustrative purposes, consider for instance a manager and a worker sharing for simplicity
the same risk tolerance. Due to prior learning experiences, the manager is assumed to exhibit
relative higher abilities in performing administrative tasks than in conducting manufacturing
related tasks. For the worker, however, the reversed relation is assumed. Now, who is superior
from a firm’s perspective? As previously emphasized, this cannot be assessed without consid-
ering the particular job characteristics. The manager is superior for jobs consisting primarily of
administrative tasks, whereas it is efficient to employ the worker for manufacturing goods. As
a result, both individuals are allocated to different jobs and obtain various incentive contracts
tailored to their respective abilities and performance measurement. Now suppose it is desirable
from the principal’s perspective to employ two managers A and B characterized by the same
risk tolerance. Assume that manager A exhibits a higher relative ability in performing adminis-
trative tasks than manager B, but the latter one can supervise her subordinates more effectively.
The previous results indicate that the principal tailors the incentive contracts to their respective
abilities. As a consequence, both managers receive different incentive contracts, even though
they are in charge of performing identical tasks.
Proposition 7. Let T ⊆ A be the set of superior types. Then, T ⊆ A can contain various
types with tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l. Nevertheless, it is possible that
(α∗(Ψk, ρk),β
∗(Ψk, ρk)) = (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β
∗(Ψl, ρl)), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A.
Proof See appendix.
This result highlights that the principal does not necessarily strictly prefer identical types
of agents. That is, a type k can be equally valuable for the principal as type l, even though
tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l. Indifference between different types of agents
requires that some of them have a comparative disadvantage in one or two of the three dimen-
sions emphasized by proposition 6, which is perfectly countervailed by a comparative advantage
in the remaining dimension(s). To exemplify the second result emphasized by proposition 7,
suppose the principal wants to employ several agents for jobs with identical characteristics.
Then, the eventually employed agents are not necessarily identical, even though their jobs are
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similar. In any case, however, it is optimal to tailor their respective incentive contract to their
individual characteristics. In general, one can expect to observe different contracts for various
types of agents. Nonetheless, it is also possible that different agents receive identical incentive
contracts.
9 Conclusion
Applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts motivates agents to imple-
ment an inefficient effort allocation across relevant tasks. This paper incorporates task-specific
abilities in a multi-task agency framework and investigates their effects on the provision of in-
centives. As demonstrated, task-specific abilities determine the efficiency of the agent’s effort
allocation and play an important role for the contractual design.
When the principal applies incongruent and noisy performance measures in incentive con-
tracts, the agent’s effort choice deviates from first-best with respect to two dimensions. First,
as well known, the optimal incentive contract induces a suboptimal effort intensity due to the
agent’s desire for insurance. Second, the agent chooses an inefficient effort allocation if the
performance measure does not reflect her contribution to gross payoff. The extent of the latter
inefficiency, however, depends on the agent’s task-specific abilities relative to the performance
measure congruity. As a result, incentive contracts are tailored to the agent’s abilities and, par-
ticularly, depend on three factors: (i) the inefficiency of effort distortion as a result of applying
incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, relative to the agent’s task-specific
abilities (distortion effect), (ii) the agent’s effort costs associated with the motivated effort al-
location (measure-cost efficiency); and (iii), the precision of the information system with the
agent’s risk-aversion (risk effect).
This paper further proposes a ranking criteria for performance measures in multi-task agen-
cies. One important observation is that the signal/noise ratio, commonly used to assess perfor-
mance measures in single-task agencies, is not a sufficient ranking criteria in multi-task agen-
cies. The relative value of performance measures depends—besides on their precision—on
their congruity relative to the agent’s task-specific abilities, thereby implying that their ranking
is tied to the agent’s characteristics. The same is true for the optimal aggregation of multiple
performance measures. As further illustrated, the principal can motivate the agent to implement
24
a first-best effort allocation if she has access to a sufficient quantity of appropriate performance
measures. However, this is only optimal if the efficient aggregation maximizes the precision of
the information system while motivating the (agent-specific) first-best effort allocation.
The characteristics of agents, particularly their task-specific human capital, do not only af-
fect their performance evaluation and incentive contracts, they also determine the benefit of their
employment from the principal’s perspective. It is consequently in the principal’s interest to ap-
ply adverse selection mechanisms to guarantee the employment of the most valuable agent. As
shown, the best available type of agent balances three effects most efficiently: (i) the distortion
effect, (ii) the measure-cost efficiency effect; and (iii), the risk effect. Due to the characteristics
of these effects, the value of individual agents is linked to the respective set of tasks the agent
is in charge of, and attributes of the information system. Different agents, however, may be
equally valuable, but may, nonetheless, receive different incentive contracts. Generally speak-
ing, task-specific abilities and the properties of information systems can explain why different
agents are allocated to various jobs; or why they receive different incentive contracts, even if
their jobs are identical.
This paper is part of a larger research agenda. Previous multi-task literature focused pri-
marily on performance measure congruity and its effect on incentive contracts. As this paper
illustrates, we can shed more light on the nature of incentive contracts in multi-task agency
relations, when we keep in mind that agents may differ in their skills and abilities to perform
particular tasks. I believe it is substantial to further explore the effects of task-specific human
capital on incentive contracts and the optimal selection of agents. In particular, if task-specific
abilities change over time due to work experience, and the principal cannot precisely observe
this mutation, she will update her beliefs about the individual abilities in accordance to the
agent’s prior performances. Such framework could contribute to our understanding of the dy-
namics of incentive contracts. However, I leave these fascinating issues for future research.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Effort distortion refers to the relation of e∗ to µ and can be therefore measured by the vector
product µte∗. Since e∗ = Γβ,
µte = β
n∑
i=1
µiΓi = β‖µ‖‖Γ‖ cos θ. (30)
First note that ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e). Furthermore, β‖Γ‖
determines the lengths of vector e∗, but not its direction in the n-dimensional space. The length
is arbitrary in the sense that it can be adjusted by β. Consequently, ΥD(θ) = cos θ ∈ [0, 1]
measures the induced effort distortion under second-best.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
To measure effort distortion, we can use the vector product µte∗. If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n,
then e∗ = βω/ψˆ. This leads to
µte =
β
ψˆ
n∑
i=1
µiωi =
β
ψˆ
‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ. (31)
Again, ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e), and β‖ω‖ determines
the lengths of vector e∗ but not its direction in the n-dimensional space. Thus, Υ¯D(ϕ) =
cosϕ ∈ [0, 1] measures distortion under second-best if ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. Consequently,
Υ¯D(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.
If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then Γi = ωi/ψˆ and ‖Γi‖ = ‖ωi‖/ψˆ, i = {j, k}. Consequently,
ΥM/C(ξ = 0) = 1 and Υ¯D(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕi), see proposition 2. By substituting Λi = ‖ωi‖2/σ2i ,
i = {j, k}, the ranking criteria of proposition 3 can be reformulated to the one stated in the
corollary.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Observe first that the expected profit on the basis of Pi(e) can be written as
Π∗ =
(µtΓi)
2
2(ωtiΓi + ρσ
2
i )
. (32)
Recall that Γi = Ψ−1ωi. Consequently, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any
other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, ∀j 6= k, if and only if,(
µtΨ−1ωk
)2
2(ωtkΨ
−1ωk + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ωj
)2
2(ωtjΨ
−1ωj + ρσ2j )
. (33)
If ωk = λωj , we can re-scale Pj(e) such that it is characterized by the same sensitivity in e as
Pk(e). Accordingly,
P¯j(e) = ω
t
je+
εj
λ
, (34)
where Var
[
P¯j(e)
]
= σ2jλ
−2. Let ω ≡ ωi, i = j, k. This leads to(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2jλ−2)
, (35)
which can be re-arranged to
1
σ2k
>
λ2
σ2j
. (36)
Recall that after re-scaling, ωk = ωj . Thus, (36) can be written as
‖ωk‖2
σ2k
>
λ2‖ωj‖2
σ2j
, (37)
which is identical to Λk > Λj .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The agent implements the first-best effort allocation, if e∗ = λefb. Note, however, that 0 < λ ≤
1 since it cannot be optimal to induce a higher effort intensity under second-best than under first-
best. Therefore, β needs to solve Ψ−1Ξtβ = λΨ−1µ, which is equivalent to Ξtβ = λµ. If
rankΞt ≥ n, there exists at least one solution of this equation system. In particular, h columns
in Ξt, n ≤ h ≤ m, must be linearly independent. Consequently, rankΞt ≥ n, if there exist no
constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying ωk = ϑlωl, k, l ∈ {1, ...,m}, k 6= l, for h performance measures
with n ≤ h ≤ m.
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Inducing a first-best effort allocation is only optimal if e(β∗) = λefb. This particulary requires
that Ξtβ∗ = λµ, or equivalently, β∗ = λ
[
Ξt
]−1
µ. Substituting β∗ gives
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1µ = λ
[
Ξt
]−1
µ (38)
ΞΨ−1 = λ
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
] [
Ξt
]−1 (39)
ΞΨ−1 = λΞΨ−1Ξt
[
Ξt
]−1
+ λρΣ
[
Ξt
]−1 (40)
(1− λ) ΞΨ−1 = λρΣ [Ξt]−1 , (41)
which is equivalent to
ρΣ =
1− λ
λ
ΞΨ−1Ξt. (42)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Suppose a type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) satisfies (29). Assume further that there exists another type ti(Ψi, ρi)
satisfying Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = Π(Ψi, ρi). This implies
µtΨˆ
−1
Ξt
[
ΞΨˆ
−1
Ξt + ρˆΣ
]−1
ΞΨˆ
−1
µ = µtΨ−1i Ξ
t
[
ΞΨ−1i Ξ
t + ρiΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1i µ. (43)
We know that tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) is exogenous but we can treat agent i’s characteristics ti(Ψi, ρi) as en-
dogenous in order to show that there can be several types satisfying (43). Accordingly, we have
an equation with n + 1 independent variables. Thus, depending on the parameter values, there
can be several types satisfying (43).
Finally observe that different types generally lead to different incentive contracts. However, to
proof that (α∗(Ψk, ρk),β∗(Ψk, ρk)) 6= (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β∗(Ψl, ρl)) is not always true, even though
tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l, I subsequently provide a counter exam-
ple. Suppose the principal receives one performance measure P (e). Assume that two types
tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l, satisfy (29), and they do not exhibit cost sub-
stitutes or complements, thereby implying that Ψl and Ψk are diagonal matrices. The optimal
incentive parameters β∗k and β
∗
l for agent k and agent l, respectively, are
β∗k =
n∑
i=1
µiωi
ψki
n∑
i=1
ωiωi
ψki
+ ρkσ
2
β∗l =
n∑
i=1
µiωi
ψli
n∑
i=1
ωiωi
ψli
+ ρlσ
2
,
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where ψji denotes agent j’s task-specific ability with respect to task i, j = k, l. Observe that
β∗k = β
∗
l , if e.g. n = 2, µ1 = µ2, ω1 = ω2 and both agents are further characterized by
ρk = ρl and ψk1 = ψl2 and ψk2 = ψl1, k 6= l. Since β∗k = β∗l and ρk = ρl, the risk premium
is identical for both agents. Although each agent implements a different effort allocation with
e∗k = (ω1β
∗
k/ψk1, ω2β
∗
k/ψk2)
t and e∗l = (ω1β
∗
l /ψl1, ω2β
∗
l /ψl2)
t, observe that C(e∗k) = C(e
∗
l )
since e∗k1 = e
∗
l2 and e
∗
k2 = e
∗
l1. As a result, α
∗(Ψk, ρk) = α∗(Ψl, ρl). If this is possible for
a single performance measure and two-dimensional effort, it can be also the case for multiple
measures and n > 2. Hence, even though two types tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl) satisfy condition
(29), it can be true that (α∗(Ψk, ρk),β∗(Ψk, ρk)) = (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β∗(Ψl, ρl)), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A.
Q.E.D.
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